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CHARGING PARTIES LEFr OUT:
INTERVENTION IN SECTION 10Q)
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS
Introduction
Employer Incorporated illegally fires two of its employees, Jean
and Hannah, because they distributed union authorization cards
during their lunch period.1
Jean and Hannah file unfair labor practice charges with a re-
gional office of the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter
NLRB or Board), which investigates their allegations that the em-
ployer violated the National Labor Relations Act (herein NLRA
or Act).2  The Board's General Counsel begins administrative
proceedings against the employer by issuing an unfair labor prac-
tice complaint. The Board also petitions a federal district court for
a preliminary injunction reinstating Jean and Hannah to their jobs
pending the administrative proceeding. As charging parties, are
Jean and Hannah entitled to intervene in the federal court action
seeking equitable relief? Federal district courts have differed over
whether charging parties may intervene in preliminary injunctive
relief proceedings brought by the National Labor Relations Board.
This Note will advocate the minority approach, which holds that
charging parties may intervene as of right in such proceedings.
The NLRB is the federal administrative agency charged with
protecting the rights that the NLRA guarantees certain employ-
ees.3  An employee discharged for supporting a labor union has
1. Under Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945), employers
subject to the National Labor Relations Act may not restrict employees from solicit-
ing union membership outside working time absent special circumstances. Employees
also have the right to distribute union literature outside working time and working
areas although on company property. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 89-90
(Patrick Hardin et aL eds., 3d ed. 1992) and cases cited therein.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). Section 7 of the Act provides: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
and protection.. .." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988). The Act protects those who fit within its definition
of "employee." Coverage excludes agricultural employees, employees who perform
domestic services at their employer's home, those employed by a parent or spouse,
supervisory employees, independent contractors, employees subject to the Railway
Labor Act, and those employed by entities that are not subject to the Act, such as
public employers or employers not engaged in commerce. Id.
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recourse with the NLRB.4 Likewise, when a union discriminates
against one whom it represents, or coerces an employee in the ex-
ercise of his or her right to refrain from union activities, the Board
has jurisdiction to remedy the violation.5 The General Counsel of
the NLRB is the appointed defender of the rights guaranteed
under the NLRA.6 The General Counsel protects employees'
rights through the Board's administrative processes. These
processes include an investigation, followed by an administrative
trial if a complaint issues, appellate review by the Board in Wash-
ington, D.C., and, if necessary, review or enforcement of a Board
order by an appropriate United States court of appeals.7 This po-
tentially lengthy administrative process may, however, be an inade-
quate remedy if employees' rights may be harmed irreparably
while the case is pending.8
Where an employer discharges a group of union supporters in
order to stem an organizing drive, it threatens the Section 7 rights
of all bargaining unit members to organize and act in concert for
mutual aid and protectionY If not remedied immediately, an illegal
firing'0 may have far reaching coercive effects upon other employ-
ees' right to organize. If the Board ultimately is convinced that the
employer discriminated against employees on account of their ex-
ercise of Section 7 rights, it can order the employer to cease and
desist from violating the Act and to reinstate the workers with back
4. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959),
the Supreme Court explained that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8
of the Act, the States as well as federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence
of the National Labor Relations Board.. .." Section 8(a)(3) of the Act makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988); see also JEF.
FmEY A. NoRxus & MICHAEL . SHERSN, JR., How To TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE
NLRB 313 (6th ed. 1992).
5. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245; 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b) (1988); NoRms &
SHERSIN, supra note 4, at 313 (NLRB has exclusive power to prevent employees and
labor organizations from engaging in unfair labor practices).
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160 (1988); see also Norris & Shersin, supra note 4, at
35-37; infra notes 30, 38-39, 44-53 and accompanying text.
7. See generally 2 THE DEvELoPmo LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1790-1800;
infra part I.A-B.
8. See infra notes 82-83 (discussing length of Board's processes and the potential
adverse effects).
9. See supra note 2.
10. Section 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
coerce employees in the exercise of their right to bargain collectively or to discrimi-
nate with regard to hire or terms or conditions of employment on account of union
support. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1988).
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pay." Years might pass before the issuance and enforcement of a
final Board order, however}2 Thus, the threat of these sanctions
sometimes is only a slight deterrent to employers, compared with
the potential increases in labor costs if employees unionize. 3
Moreover, a remedy imposed only after the defeat of an organizing
campaign generally allows employers to retain the primary benefit
gained from their illegal actions, that is, the defeat of the union.14
The Board's ultimate power to fashion relief in such a case, there-
fore, requires that a more immediate order be issued. Section 10(j)
of the Act'5 empowers the Board to seek such preliminary relief.
It provides in pertinent part:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint...
charging that any person has engaged or is engaging in an unfair
labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within
any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is al-
leged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or trans-
acts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order.16
Historically, the Board has instituted Section 10() proceedings
very rarely, but since April 1994, the Board has brought them with
greater frequency.17
There are several possible explanations for the Board's recent
unprecedented Section 10(j) activity. Without question, President
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988).
12. See infra note 82 (discussing passage of time during pendency of Board unfair
labor practice proceedings).
13. For examples of employers engaging in obviously illegal activities and resisting
the Board's remedies, see infra note 20.
14. The Board sometimes can provide a modicum of relief in this regard. Under
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Board can order an employer to
bargain with the union even without an election if the union at one time represented
an uncoerced majority of batgaining unit members and if the employer's actions had
been so destructive of Section 7 rights as to make a fair election impossible. How-
ever, this plainly is a high standard. Moreover, if the employer engages in discrimina-
tion prior to the union acquiring authorization by a majority of bargaining unit
members, the Board will not issue a bargaining order even though an employer's ille-
gal conduct may meet the "outrageous and pervasive" standard set forth in Gissel.
Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 586 (1984).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1988).
16. Id.
17. The Board filed sixty-two § 10(j) petitions between March and September of
1994, compared with annual totals ranging from twenty-six to forty-two between 1990
and 1993. NLRB Cites Successes; FDA is Challenged, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 12, 1994, at
A16. The NLRB General Counsel's fourteen requests to petition for Section 10(j)
relief during May 1994, was the most such requests ever made by a General Counsel
in a single month. See Remarks of NLRB Chairman Gould to the Commonwealth
Club, San Francisco, BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT, June 13, 1994, at E2.
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Clinton's appointments of William B. Gould IV and Fred Feinstein
as Chairman and General Counsel, respectively, of the NLRB are
the most immediate and direct causes of the increased Section 10()
caseload. Chairman Gould advocated the increased use of Section
10(j) even before he was appointed to his current post.18 Addition-
ally, General Counsel Feinstein is perceived to hold a more pro-
active and employee-oriented perspective than his predecessors. 19
Thus, political change in the Board's personnel has been an impor-
tant factor in the agency's increased use of Section 100).
It is important to note that the decision by Chairman Gould and
General Counsel Feinstein to use Section 10(j) more often than in
the past may merely be the inevitable result of an objective analysis
of the current state of affairs. The Board's inability to deter viola-
tions of the Act20 has prompted many onlookers to express frustra-
18. In his 1993 book, AGENDA FOR REFORM, then Professor Gould characterized
the Board's scant use of Section 10(j) from 1982 through 1992 as "profoundly puz-
zling" and stated that Section 10() "warrants attention, perhaps, in the form of more
rigorous guidelines that exhort the Board to seek injunctive relief." WILLIAM B.
GOULD lV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 161 (1993).
Incidentally, AGENDA FOR REFORM was a widely discussed topic in Chairman
Gould's Senate confirmation hearings. See Louis Freedberg, Stanford Professor OKdfor NLRB Post, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 3, 1994, at A3. The book advocates
more assertive law enforcement by the Board, and this was a primary reason for the
narrowness of the margin (58-38) by which he was confirmed. Id.
19. The New York Times quoted Greg Tarpinian of the Labor Research Associa-
tion of New York as saying that "[General Counsel] 'Feinstein and the rest of the
team are people that believe in unions. That's a major shift.'" Barbara P. Noble, At
Work; At the Labor Boar4 New Vigor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, § 3, at 21. The
Times also quoted Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union Southern re-
gional director Bruce Raynor as saying that even during the first few months of Gen-
eral Counsel Feinstein's tenure, the Board had been "'much more aggressive about
enforcing the law."' Id. General Counsel Feinstein termed the increased utilization
of Section 10(j) injunctive proceedings the "cornerstone" of his administration of the
Act. NLRB Cites Successes; FDA is Challenged, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 12, 1994, at A16
(quoting General Counsel Feinstein's report of litigation activity).
Prior to becoming Chairman of the NLRB, William Gould speculated that NLRB
General Counsels during the Reagan and Bush Administrations simply did not have
the interest in Section 10() proceedings that previous General Counsels did. See
Gould, supra note 18, at 161.
20. The Board's power to prevent violations of the Act is remedial in nature, not
punitive. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940); NoRRIs & SrIMR-
sIN, supra note 4, at 441; see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of
American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91
MICH. L. Rnv. 419,506 (1992) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,208
(1941) (Stone, J., concurring)). Moreover, the Board considers some types of dam-
ages to be too speculative to award in individual cases. See, e.g., Tildee Products, Inc.,
194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1235 (1972) (Board declining to estimate what contract terms an
employer would have agreed to had it bargained in good faith and otherwise obeyed
the law, on remand from D.C. Circuit, which had concluded that initial Board remedy
[Vol. XXH
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tion with the Board's remedial scheme.21 Besides the fact that
was inadequate to compensate damaged party). For example, increased wages or
benefits that an entire work force might have gained but for an employer's use of
illegal methods to defeat an organizing drive are great by comparison to the lost
wages of a few discharged employees, but can not be calculated in individual cases. Id.
at 1235.
The deficiency in the Board's remedial powers is perhaps most significant in the
context of union organizing, where the stakes are likely the highest. By comparing
the total number of votes cast for unions in NLRB elections with the number of em-
ployees illegally discharged on account of their pro-union activity, Richard Freeman
and James Medoff estimated that one in twenty employees favoring a union during
1984 organizing campaigns was fired illegally; roughly one employee per NLRB rep-
resentation election conducted that year. RicHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L.
MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 233 (1984). More recent NLRB statistics bear out
the Freeman and Medoff conclusion. The NLRB's Fifty-Seventh Annual Report
shows that 3,811 discharged employees were offered reinstatement to their jobs pur-
suant to unfair labor practice cases closed in 1992. See 57 NLRB ANN. REP. 127
(1992). Of the representation cases initiated by labor unions for collective bargaining
representative certification that the Board closed in 1992, there were 3,094 elections.
See 57 NLRB ANN. REP. 127 (1992).
For an example of how far an entity can go in resisting Board remedies, see
Autoprod, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 331 (1982). In Autoprod, the Board noted that "[t]he
Respondent's flagrant misconduct... caps a decade of contumancy and flagrant disre-
gard of its employees' rights under the Act during which the Respondent has flouted
court-enforced orders of the Board and persistently ignored its statutory obligations."
Autoprod, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. at 331. The Board ordered Autoprod to pay the Board's
costs of litigating and preparing the case, departing from the "traditional forms of
relief [which, under the circumstances, the Board found to be] inadequate as a means
of effectuating the policies of the Act." Id. at 333. The Board took this extreme action
only after ten years of remedial frustration, however. See id.
For another example of the insufficiency of the Board's remedial scheme to prevent
repeated violations of the Act, see Tildee Products, 194 N.L.R.B. at 1236-37. In Tildee
Products, employees chose a union as their collective representative pursuant to an
NLRB-conducted representation election. Tildee Products, 194 N.L.R.B. at 1236-37.
Thereafter, the employer filed frivolous objections to the election and refused to bar-
gain with the union. Id. The Board upheld the election results and ordered the em-
ployer to bargain. Id. On appeal of the Board's order, the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded the case to the Board to impose a different remedy, on grounds that
the original Board remedy encouraged frivolous litigation. Id. (citing Int'l Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1251 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970)). On remand, the Board ordered the employer to
reimburse the union for certain of its litigation costs and expenses. See Tildee Prod-
ucts, 194 N.L.R.B. at 1236-37.
Tildee Products and Autoprod mark only the outer limits of how far a respondent
can go in resisting the Act before the Board will take extraordinary remedial action.
21. See, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 233; THOMAs GEOrHEGAN,
WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 252-53 (1991); Charles Morris, The NLRB in the Dog
House - Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks? 24 SAN DIEGo L. Rpv. 9 (1987); Paul
Weiler, Promises to Keep Securing Workers' Rights to Self-organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769 (1983).
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Board remedies are non-punitive in nature,22 the Board's require-
ment that all related unfair labor practice charges against a single
employer be tried concurrently23 has likely been a substantial rea-
son why traditional Board remedies have been ineffective and why
the current Board has resorted to Section 10(j) petitions to pre-
serve its remedial power.
If the employer in our hypothetical example feared that the rein-
statement of Jean and Hannah might resurrect the union organiz-
ing campaign, the employer could delay the Board's administrative
proceedings by undertaking a second series of firings based upon
employees' union support. In such a case, the Board's General
Counsel would stay the proceeding in Jean's and Hannah's case in
order to include the new unfair labor practice allegations in its
pending complaint. An investigation and amendment of the com-
plaint would follow before the administrative trial would resume.
If pro-union sentiments still existed near the close of trial on the
amended complaint, the employer could undertake yet another se-
ries of unfair labor practices. These practices also would need to
be charged, investigated, incorporated into the pending complaint,
and tried. Only after an initial decision on the consolidated com-
plaint, review by the Board, and circuit court enforcement, could
the employer be compelled to reinstate Jean and Hannah. This hy-
pothetical fact pattern illustrates a classic case where preliminary
22. See Republic Steel, 311 U.S. at 10; NORRS & SHERSIN, supra note 4, at 441; see
also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 506 (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 208 (1941) (Stone, J., concurring)).
23. In Jefferson Chemical Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 992, n.3 (1972), the Board set forth
the general rule that unfair labor practice complaints will be barred procedurally if
the General Counsel knew or should have known about an alleged unfair labor prac-
tice prior to the close of administrative trial in an earlier related unfair labor practice
case against the same respondent and declined to incorporate the new charges into
the pending complaint. Because the Jefferson Chemical doctrine governs a procedural
aspect of the General Counsel's case preparation, the central holding in that case has
not often been revisited in the twenty years since the rule was first promulgated. In
order to put the issue before the Board again, the General Counsel would have to
neglect to amend a pending complaint despite knowledge of a related unfair labor
practice. If the General Counsel were to lose such a case before the Board, the subse-
quent unfair labor practice complaint would be dismissed altogether, allowing no re-
lief for the aggrieved parties. Rather than take this chance, the General Counsel,
understandably, will stay the pending proceeding in order to insure that some remedy
will be available at the end of the administrative process. Thus, the outer limits of the
Jefferson Chemical doctrine have not been established by the Board, nor are they
likely to be because of the doctrine's unusual nature.
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injunctive relief is necessary to protect the Board's ultimate reme-
dial powers.24
The Board has maintained its traditionally high success rate in
Section 10(j) cases during the recent wave of petitions, obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief in thirty of the thirty-six cases that
were instituted under General Counsel Feinstein and resolved by
September 30, 1994.2- Because Section 100) injunctive relief issues
only when a court determines that such an order is necessary to
insure the effectiveness of the Board's remedial powers, the contin-
ued high success rate of Section 10(j) petitions indicates that the
Board's increased Section 10(j) activity is not an extreme reaction,
but merely a reasoned response to the Board's remedial difficulties
and to private actors' disregard of Board orders. Increasingly ag-
gressive anti-union employer behavior may be another reason for
the Board's increased use of Section 10(j).2
Whatever the cause of the Board's increased Section 100) activ-
ity, the scant jurisprudence governing Section 10(j) petitions will be
developed extensively in the coming years if the current volume of
Section 10() cases persists. This Note will focus on unfair labor
practice procedures and on whether charging parties, those who
file unfair labor practice charges with the Board, may intervene as
of right in Section 10() proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24(a)(2).
Part I will discuss the Board's enforcement framework and the
role charging parties play at each of the three possible stages of
unfair labor practice proceedings: (i) pre-complaint proceedings,
24. For one example of a repeated series of unfair labor practices delaying resolu-
tion of pending allegations, see S. Lichtenberg & Co., 1991 NLRB Lexis 450 (ALJ
decision 1991). In Lichtenberg, administrative trial was adjourned and resumed nu-
merous times over a period of years so that the General Counsel could incorporate
new allegations of unfair labor practices. See id.
25. See NLRB Cites Successes; FDA is Challenged, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 12, 1994, at
A16 (quoting General Counsel Feinstein's report of litigation activity).
26. In WHAT Do UrNONs Do?, Richard Freeman and James Medoff charted the
instances of Employer Unfair Labor Practices, Section 8(a)(3) charges, and reinstate-
ments of workers as compared to the number of representation elections conducted
by the NLRB. FRmAnMN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 232 (1984). Their study re-
vealed that although the number of NLRB elections held annually decreased slightly
from 1970 through 1980, all the other categories at least doubled, with the number of
workers ordered reinstated increasing more than four-fold. Id. The Freeman and
Medoff work hypothesizes that employers' recognition that Board remedies can be
avoided has caused the more aggressive anti-union tactics. Id. In an anecdotal com-
mentary, Thomas Geoghegan makes the same hypothesis. See Geoghegan, supra
note 21, at 252-56. Moreover, the growth of union-busting consulting firms has no
doubt contributed to employers' willingness to flout the Act and the Board. Id.; FREE-
MAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 230-36.
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(ii) post-complaint proceedings for permanent relief,27 and (iii)
preliminary injunctive relief proceedings. Part II will discuss Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and the criteria it sets forth
for non-statutory intervention as of right. Part III will analyze
whether Rule 24(a)(2) entitles charging parties to intervene as of
right in Section 10j) district court proceedings. Part IV will con-
clude that courts that have denied charging parties' Rule 24(a)(2)
motions to intervene have misapplied the controlling law.
I. Unfair Labor Practice Procedure
Section 7 of the Acts guarantees employees the right to engage
in self-organization and other activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid and protection. The section
also guarantees employees the right to refrain from engaging in
such activities. 29 The Board's General Counsel enforces these
rights through the framework established in Sections 8 and 10 of
the Act.3 Section 8(a) describes employer unfair labor practices
and Section 8(b) describes union unfair labor practices.31 Adminis-
trative proceedings brought through Section 10 of the Act to pre-
vent violations of Section 8(a) or 8(b) are referred to as unfair
labor practice proceedings, as distinct from representation pro-
ceedings, through which the Board resolves questions concerning
representation. 32
27. For purposes of this Note, "permanent relief" refers to relief that is perma-
nent in that it will not be altered subsequently by further administrative proceedings
(Le, a final Board order), as distinct from preliminary relief, which remains in effect
only pending the issuance of a final Board order.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
29. See id.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (1988).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988). Additionally, Section 8(e) makes it an unfair labor
practice for any labor organization or any employer to enter into an agreement re-
stricting with whom the employer does business. The most common unfair labor
practice cases involve alleged violations of Section 8(a) and 8(b), however. This Note,
therefore, will not discuss the provisions of Section 8(e) in detail.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988). The Board's administrative framework is essen-
tially divided into two areas: representation proceedings and unfair labor practice
proceedings. Where employees wish to be represented by a union (or to cease such
representation), they can petition the Board for an election to determine the bargain-
ing unit's representation status. The Board thereafter will conduct an investigation
and hearings as to what bargaining unit is appropriate and determine if there is a
sufficient showing of interest to warrant holding an election. The Board conducts
representation elections and thereafter may hold adminstrative hearings on objections
to conduct that may have affected the results of the election. Finally, the Board will
certify the election results and parties indirectly may appeal the representation pro-
ceedings by committing unfair labor practices and contesting the Board representa-
840 [Vol. XXII
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The Board's administrative framework in the unfair labor prac-
tice setting bears similarities both to civil and criminal actions, but
it is not wholly analogous to either. Like civil actions, administra-
tive unfair labor practice proceedings commence only if an ag-
grieved party officially charges that a violation has occurred. 33
Moreover, any relief obtained through the administrative processes
generally goes to the party wronged by the violations,34 and such
party has the opportunity to participate and be represented by
counsel at administrative hearings and appeals and at any court
review of the administrative order. 5 In these aspects, unfair labor
practice cases resemble civil litigation. Additionally, there are no
criminal penalties for violating the Act,36 and the standard of prov-
ing violations is the "preponderance" of the evidence.37
On the other hand, formal unfair labor practice administrative
proceedings cannot actually be brought by private parties but only
by the Board's General Counsel,38 whose role as an advocate of
employees' and the public's interest is analogous to that of a prose-
cutor in criminal cases. On account of the General Counsel's ex-
tensive discretion as to the scope of a proceeding,39 the victims of
unfair labor practices lack control of the case against those who
have wronged them, as do victims of crime.
The National Labor Relations Act enforcement framework dif-
fers from the administrative schemes of other federal agencies.
tion case determinations during circuit court review of the unfair labor practices. The
Board's Statements of Procedures sets forth the procedural guidelines for unfair labor
practice cases and for representation cases. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1994) with 29
C.F.R. § 101.17 (1994). For a full discussion of representation case procedure, see
Noiuus & SHERSIN, supra note 4, at 55-300.
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
34. Specifically, Section 10(c) permits the Board to "take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988). In an exceptional case, the Board
once ordered a respondent to compensate the Board for its expenses in preparing and
litigating the case because the respondent had, for ten years, continually and fla-
grantly ignored its statutory responsibilities, and the Board's court enforced orders.
See Autoprod, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 331, 332 (1982). This is not an ordinary remedy,
however. Id.
35. See infra notes 56-62, 68, 78-79 and accompanying text.
36. The Board's powers are remedial in nature, not punitive. See Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940); NoRRIus & SHERSIN, supra note 4, at 441. Re-
peated violations of the Act, where such violations have previously been enjoined by
a court could eventually result in criminal contempt sanctions, but such penalties
would be for violation of the injunction rather than violation of the Act.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988).
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160(a) (1988).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988).
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Under the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (herein-
after EEOC) framework, for example, through which many of the
federal civil rights laws are enforced, private parties have in-
dependent rights to sue in federal court even where the EEOC
maintains that no law has been violated. 40 Additionally, because
the federal civil rights laws authorize widespread private enforce-
ment of their provisions, affected private parties enjoy full rights of
participation, appeal and control against those who have illegally
wronged them.41 In the labor law context, by contrast, both under
the NLRA and under some sections of the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, federal agencies such as the
Board or the Secretary of Labor have full discretion as to whether
to prosecute alleged violations of law.42 Accordingly, private par-
ties' rights to participate and appeal once the appropriate federal
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988) (providing a private right of action to
individuals aggrieved by violations of Title VII in addition to empowering the EEOC
to deter violations and prosecute civil actions against offenders); General Tel. Co. v.
EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (where EEOC brings suit in vindication of private
rights, the private parties whose rights are at stake may intervene).
41. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, empowers the EEOC to
deter individual acts of illegal discrimination against specific persons by instituting
suit under § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988); the EEOC also may institute suit
under § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1988) against entities engaged in a pattern or prac-
tice of illegal discrimination.
Where the EEOC brings suit pursuant to § 706, it does so in vindication of private
rights although there is also a public interest component to the EEOC's representa-
tion. General TeL Co. 446 U.S. at 325-326. For this reason, the Supreme Court has
noted that aggrieved persons may intervene in § 706 actions instituted by the EEOC.
Id. at 326.
On the other hand, where the EEOC brings suit pursuant to § 707 because a re-
spondent is engaged in an illegally discriminatory pattern or practice, the EEOC's suit
is purely in the public interest, and private parties do not necessarily have the right to
intervene. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1975). Section 707 actions brought by the EEOC, however, generally do not have
preclusive effects on private parties who may assert § 706 claims alleging individual
acts of discrimination. Id.
One court that denied an applicant's motion to intervene in a § 707 action expressly
relied upon the fact that the private party had continuing free access to adequate
private remedies. Id. at 844-45. Moreover, that court distinguished § 707 cases from
the labor law context where private parties do not always enjoy free access to ade-
quate private remedies but rather must rely upon federal agencies to enforce their
statutory rights. I at 845 n.21.
42. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (discussing the NLRB's exclusive
authority to enforce NLRA rights); notes 164-68 (discussing the exclusive authority of
the Secretary of Labor to initiate suit to set aside elections conducted in violation of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act provisions).
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agency has undertaken to prosecute the alleged violations have
been subject to litigation.43
A. Pre-Complaint Proceedings
An unfair labor practice case begins when an individual or entity
aggrieved by conduct allegedly violative of the Act lodges a charge
with a regional office of the NLRB." A timely charge triggers a
Board investigation into the allegations and is a prerequisite for
the charging party ultimately to obtain relief.45 Upon receiving a
charge, the Board regional office files it, dockets it and assigns it a
case number. 6 Yet, official Board proceedings against a charged
party do not begin merely by the filing of a charge. 47
After receiving the charge, a Board regional office investigates
on behalf of the Board's General Counsel to determine whether it
will issue an unfair labor practice complaint .4  A complaint is the
formal pleading that begins an official administrative proceeding
against the charged party.49 While charging parties usually take
part in the investigation by giving affidavits and offering position
letters that outline pertinent facts and make legal argument, charg-
43. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) (resolving interven-
tion issue in Title IV Labor Manangement Reporting and Disclosure Act case); Pas-
carell v. Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990) (permitting intervention in § 10(j)
case but not discussing grounds therefor in reported opinion); Advertisers Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 677 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Help-
ers Union, Local No. 610, 440 F.2d 124, 132 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming district court's
denial of intervention in § 10(1) case); Wilson v. Liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp. 1120
(W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd as modifted, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), va-
cated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1981) (denying intervention in § 10(j) case);
Scott v. Toyota of Berkely, Inc., 106 L.R.R.M. 2070 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (permitting in-
tervention in § 10(j) case but not discussing grounds therefor in reported opinion);
Seeler v. Williams, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2765 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); Squillacote v.
UAW Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491, 492-493 (E.D. Ws. (1974) (denying intervention in
§ 10(j) case); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2976 (M.D. Fla.
1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); Youngblood v. Scottex, 80
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (granting intervention in § 10(j) case); Reyn-
olds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (denying intervention in
§ 10(j) case); Penello v. Burlington Indus., 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963)
(same); Phillips v. United Mine Workers, 218 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (same).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1994).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1994). Additionally, the
charge must be in writing and signed and must set forth the full name and address of
the person making the charge, the full name and address of the person against whom
the charge is made, and a clear and concise statement of the facts constituting alleged
unfair labor practices affecting commerce. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2, 102.11 (1994).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1994).
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1994).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
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ing parties have few enforceable rights at this stage.50 If the re-
gional office declines to issue a complaint, the charging party may
seek review by the Appeals Office of the Board's General Coun-
sel.51 The charging party's participation in the General Counsel's
review, however, is generally limited to providing position letters.52
Moreover, if the General Counsel decides not to issue a complaint,
the decision is not subject to review.53 Because Board unfair labor
practice proceedings against a charged party officially do not begin
until a complaint issues, a refusal by the Board's General Counsel
to issue a complaint effectively ends the charging party's case
before it commences. Provided that a complaint does issue, how-
ever, the charging party becomes virtually a full partner with the
Board's General Counsel in all subsequent proceedings for perma-
nent relief, with extensive rights to participate and appeal.54
B. Post-Complaint Proceedings for Permanent Relief
Once the Board issues a complaint, it schedules the case for a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (herein ALJ).55 At
the hearing, the charging party is allowed to be present;56 to be
represented; 57 to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses;58 to
introduce documentary evidence into the record;59 to state objec-
tions; 60 to offer legal argument orally at the close of hearing;61 and
50. See NoRsS & SHERSIN, supra, note 4 at 332.
51. The charging party has fourteen days from service of a regional director's let-
ter refusing to issue a complaint to appeal the refusal to the Appeals Office of the
General Counsel. See NORIS & SHERSIN, supra note 4, at 332 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.19(a) and NLRB CASEHANMLtNG MANUAL 1 10122.4).
52. A party taking appeal also may request the opportunity to personally present
its view of the facts and law to the General Counsel, see 29 C.F.R. § 102.19(b) (1994),
but such requests are discouraged and are granted only within the General Counsel's
discretion. See NoRRIs & SHERsIN supra, note 4, at 336; 29 C.F.R. § 102.19(b) (1994).
53. See Machinists v. Lubbers, 681 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1201 (1983); Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc. v. NLRB 587 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (stating, in dicta, that the General
Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint is unreviewable); Rockford Ready-Mix
Co. v. Zipp, 482 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. I1. 1979) (holding that a mandamus action will
not lie against a regional director to compel the issuance of a complaint).
54. See infra notes 56-64, 78-79 and accompanying text.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1994).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 102.41 (1994).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 102.8, .42.
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to file a post-hearing brief.62 During the administrative trial, the
Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure are adhered to "so
far as practicable." 63 The ALJ is both the trier of fact and, in the
first instance, the interpreter of law.64 After the hearing, the ALU
submits Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Proposed Or-
der 65 to the Board."6
The ALJ decision automatically becomes the decision of the
Board if no party objects to it.67 Any party may, however, fie ex-
ceptions to the ALT's decision and a supporting brief with the
Board,6 obliging the Board to issue an appropriate order after re-
view of the transcript and the AL's findings.69 The Board will re-
verse an ALJ's findings of fact only if they are not supported by the
record,70 but the Board does not accord deference to the ALU's
legal determinations. A Board order is the final administrative de-
termination on the merits of an unfair labor practice case.71 The
Board may adopt, reject or modify the AL's findings and recom-
mendations.72 The final Board order may dismiss the complaint or,
in the alternative, require the party that violated the Act to cease
and desist from its illegal behavior and take appropriate affirma-
tive action.73 The remedies available include reinstating illegally
discharged employees, with or without back pay.74 Board orders
62. Id
63. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 102.39 (1994).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.45(a) (1994).
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 102.45(a) (1994).
66. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.45(a).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(a) (1994).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(a) (1994).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(b) (1994).
70. The Board adopted this policy in Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 N.L.R.B. 544
(1950), enfd., 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951), reasoning that because the AUJ has the
opportunity to observe demeanor evidence during testimony, the Board is ill-
equipped to review the ALJ's credibility determinations. The Board still follows this
doctrine, citing Standard Dry Wall Products at footnote 1 of virtually every opinion in
which a party has objected to an AIJ's factual findings. See, eg., Acme Die Casting,
315 N.L.R.B. 30 (1994).
71. Subsequent to the issuance of a final Board order, further proceedings regard-
ing compliance with the Board order sometimes are necessary. However, questions
as to whether the Act was violated initially can no longer be disputed at the compli-
ance stage. For a full discussion of compliance proceedings, see Noams & SHERsN,
supra note 4, at 465-94.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 101.12(a) (1994).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 101.12(a) (1994).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
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are not self-enforcing, however, and review is taken directly to an
appropriate United States court of appeals.
Circuit courts generally defer to the Board's administrative ex-
pertise, recognizing that the NLRA invests the Board with wide
ranging discretion to interpret and administer the Act.76 Neverthe-
less, the circuit courts provide meaningful review of the Board's
determinations.77 Any party to the Board proceeding may appeal
an adverse determination to an appropriate United States circuit
court78 and may intervene in circuit court review proceedings even
where the Board determination was favorable to it.79
Thus, the law is well-settled as to charging parties' participation
rights at the pre-complaint stage and at the post-complaint perma-
nent relief stage. Charging parties have very limited formal rights
of participation and appeal of the Board's General Counsel's dis-
cretionary decision of whether to issue a formal unfair labor prac-
tice complaint.80  Nonetheless, charging parties enjoy extensive
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1988). The Board may petition for enforcement
"in any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to which
application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States,
within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in ques-
tion occurred or wherein (the entity which allegedly committed an unfair labor prac-
tice] resides or transacts business." 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988).
A party aggrieved by a final Board order may obtain review "in any United States
court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was al-
leged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1988).
76. Section 10(e) of the Act provides that "t]he findings of the Board with respect
to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988). For a discussion of this stan-
dard and courts' interpretation of it, see 2 THm DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note
1, at 1886-90 and authorities cited therein.
In reviewing determinations of law, courts are required to give substantial weight to
the Board's judgment, especially where the Board clearly articulates its reasoning and
the question of law at issue involves interpretation or administration of the Act. See 2
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 1, at 1890-93 and authorities cited therein.
77. The Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act added Section 10(e)'s provision that
the Board's factual determinations be conclusive only if supported by "substantial"
evidence "on the record considered as a whole," see 29 U.SC. § 16 (1988) in order to
insure more scrutinizing circuit court review of the Board's factual determinations
than had been prevalent theretofore. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 1, at 1886-87 (citing Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. 340 U.S. 474 (1951)). The
Act does not require circuit courts to accord the Board's legal determinations even
that much deference. See 2 Tim DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1890-93
and authorities cited therein.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988).
79. See UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 208 (1965).
80. See supra part I.A.
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rights of participation and appeal in all permanent relief proceed-
ings after the complaint issues.81
C. Preliminary Injunctive Relief Proceedings
The administrative proceedings outlined above frequently take
years before there is a final Board order and court enforcement. s2
Such a delay can undermine the Board's ultimate ability to fashion
an appropriate remedys 3 For example, employees who were ille-
gally fired may have moved on to a new job or a new area by the
time the Board considers a final order.' By then, reinstatement
could be impractical and, in any event, the firings' coercive effects
on other employees likely would be irreversible. Accordingly, the
Act empowers the Board to protect its remedial powers by seeking
preliminary injunctive relief in federal district court.s Section
10(j) of the Act grants the Board a general right to petition for
preliminary injunction in unfair labor practice cases. 6 Section
10(1) provides additional authorization for the Board to seek pre-
liminary relief in certain types of unfair labor practice cases. s7
Although there are differences between Section 10(j) and Section
81. See supra part I.B.
82. Analysis of the Board's reports reveals that the annually calculated median
elapsed time between filing and the issuance of a final Board order in unfair labor
practice cases ranged from 273 days to 395 days during the period 1984 to 1989. See
GouLD, supra note 18, at 159. In cases the Board termed as "major" cases, it took the
Board a median of 736 days in fiscal year 1989 and a median of 691 days in fiscal year
1990 to process the case from filing to a final Board order. Id. Of course, final Board
orders are subject to circuit court review. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying
text. Thus, even longer periods of time elapsed before relief was granted in many of
those cases.
83. In fact, section 10(j) was enacted precisely because of the lengthy administra-
tive process and the threat it poses to the Board's remedial authority. The legislative
history reveals Congressional concern that "[i]t has sometimes been possible for per-
sons violating the Act to accomplish their illegal purpose before being placed under
any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or
preserve the status quo." 2 TH DevmtOPINo LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1819(quoting S. REr. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947)).
84. Of the 3,811 discharged employees offered reinstatement pursuant to unfair
labor practice cases closed during 1992, 595 declined to return. 57 NLRB Am. REP.
127 (1992). Of the 3,023 employees offered reinstatement pursuant to unfair labor
practice cases closed during 1991, 569 declined to return. 56 NLRB ANN. REP. 163(1991). The likelihood that a discharged employee will accept an offer of reinstate-
ment no doubt decreases with the passage of time between discharge and the offer of
reinstatement.
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) (1988).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 160j).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l).
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10(l),u the injunctive relief provisions are similar.89 This Note will
focus on Section 100) proceedings, and will discuss the provisions
of Section 10(1) only where they are pertinent to the courts' and
the Board's interpretation of Section 10(j).
1. Background of Section 10(j)
Section 100) was enacted in 1947 as part of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which amended the NLRA in part and added the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act (herein LMRA) to the federal labor law statu-
tory scheme.90 Section 100) did not alter the substantive labor
law;91 it merely provided an additional enforcement mechanism for
special cases where the normal administrative framework is inade-
quate to remedy violations. Section 100) is an exception to the
general rule that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to enjoin
labor disputes92 and should not be used in typical unfair labor prac-
tice cases. Rather, as the Board Manual on Section 10(j) injunc-
tions states:
What distinguishes a 100) case from other unfair labor practice
cases is the threat of remedial failure. This threat may be
demonstrated by the nature and extent of the alleged violations,
the circumstances surrounding the violations, and the antici-
pated and actual impact of the unremedied violations or "chill"
upon statutory rights that is expected to continue until a Board
order issues.93
Accordingly, courts have recognized that Section 100) relief is "an
extraordinary remedy, to be requested by the Board and granted
88. Pertinent to the intervention analysis, Section 10(l) provides that charging par-
ties may "appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony" at proceedings for
injunctive relief brought under it, while Section 100) has no corresponding provision.
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988); see 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1988). Additionally, Section 10(l) of
the Act requires the Board to prioritize charges that a union has engaged in a secon-
dary boycott, and the section specifically directs the Board to seek injunctive relief in
those circumstances. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(1).
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1).
90. 61 Stat. 146 (1947).
91. Other portions of the Taft-Hartley Act did have this effect, such as the amend-
ment of Section 7 and creation of Section 8(b), which entrusted the NLRB with regu-
lating certain union practices. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b) (1988).
92. See Section 1, Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
93. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD MANUAL ON SECrION 10(J) INJUNC-
TIONS, May,1994 Internal National Labor Relations Board Memoranda reprinted with
portions delected, under Freedom of Information Act at 1994, Daily Labor Report
No. 150 (BNA), special supplement S-4 (Aug. 8, 1994). The Board's Section 10 (G)
Manual is a statment of procedures and policies for Board agents to follow in "identi-
fying, investigating and litigating all types of Section 100) cases." Report of the
NLRB General Counsel, 1994 Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 226 (Nov. 28, 1994).
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by the district court only under very limited circumstances." 94 One
court termed Section 10(j) "an extraordinary tool" because it re-
quires decisive judicial action "before a full airing of the facts and a
careful consideration of the law."95
When the Board ifies a Section 10(j) petition for preliminary in-
junctive relief, the district court serves notice upon the party
against whom the injunction is sought and, "thereupon, shall have
jurisdiction to grant the Board such temporary relief or restraining
order as it deems just and proper."96 Courts employ a two-part test
in determining whether to award Section 10(j) injunctive relief.
The test considers (i) whether the Board has reasonable cause to
believe the Act has been violated, and (ii) whether such relief is
"just and proper" within the meaning of the Section.97
The "reasonable cause to believe" prong generally requires only
a "low standard of proof.19 8 In order to satisfy this prong, the
Board need not convince the court either that its legal theory is
correct or that the respondent actually engaged in the alleged ac-
tivities.99 Rather, the Board only needs to show that its theory of
liability "is substantial and not frivolous,"''0° and that there is suffi-
cient evidence for "a rational fact finder, considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Board"10 1 to conclude that the
facts are as the Board alleges. Thus, the first prong of the test ac-
cords substantial deference to the Board's decision to petition for
Section 10(j) relief.
The "just and proper" prong, on the other hand, requires district
courts to use discretion in assessing the justness and propriety of
equitable relief.1°2 As a result, Section 10(j) hearings typically fo-
94. Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 374 (11th Cir. 1992).
95. Kinney v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, 994 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th
Cir. 1993).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 160j).
97. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considers only
whether relief is "just and proper." Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1989). Every other circuit to consider the issue uses the two part test, however. See 2
THE DEvELoPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1819-20 and cases cited therein.
98. Eisenberg v. Wellington Hall Nursing Home, 651 F2d 902, 905 (3d Cir. 1981).
99. See Gottf-ied v. Frankel, 818 F.2d 485,493 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Arlook v. S.
Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 371 (11th Cir. 1992); Pascarell v. Vibra Screw, 904
F.2d 874, 882 (3d Cir. 1990).
100. Gottfried, 818 F.2d at 493; see also S. Lichtenberg, 952 F.2d at 371; Vibra Screw,
904 F.2d at 882.
101. S. Lichtenberg, 952 F.2d at 371; see also Gottfried, 818 F.2d at 493; Vibra
Screw, 904 F.2d at 882.
102. Courts have differed on the proper application of this standard. See 2 THE
DEvELoPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1821. Most circuits hold that a showing
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cus on this all-important "just and proper" prong of the analysis.
Full administrative hearings will follow whether or not an injunc-
tion issues. For this reason,.Section 10j) hearings are abbreviated
and do not require strict adherence to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 0 3 Courts often take live testimony, but they may consider
other evidence, such as affidavits10 and any administrative record
or decision.0 5
Charging parties have the most to gain from relief granted pur-
suant to Section 100),l0 and they often desire to participate in the
district court proceedings to present evidence and argue that a pre-
liminary injunction should be issued. Additionally, the rights to
appeal and to participate at circuit court review proceedings may
be contingent on participation at the district court level. °7 The
participation rights of charging parties at the district court level of
Section 10(j) proceedings, therefore, are important as a practical
matter.
that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to prevent frustration of the Board's
remedial power is sufficient to satisfy the "just and proper" prong. Id. The Second
Circuit requires a showing that Section 10(j) relief is necessary to preserve the status
quo or to prevent irreparable harm, while the Third Circuit requires that the relief
requested be in the public interest, and the Seventh Circuit applies traditional equita-
ble principles to determine whether petitioned for Section 10(j) relief is just and
proper. Id. and cases cited therein.
103. The court, in its discretion, may even proceed without an evidentiary hearing.
See Norris & Shersin, supra note 4, at 550 and cases cited therein.
104. See Norris & Shersin, supra note 4, at 550 and cases cited.; see also Squillacote
v. UAW Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (deciding that the court
may grant or deny injunctive relief under the Act based upon the parties' affidavits).
105. See Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 40 n.11 (2d Cir. 1975) ("On re-
mand, the district court should consider not only the transcript of the hearing ... but
also the findings which have since been made by the administrative law judge, who
heard the evidence and observed the demeanor of the witnesses." (citation omitted));
Eisenberg v. Honeycomb Plastics Corp., 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3257, 3262 (D. NJ.
1987) ("the administrative record therefore constitutes an ample statement of the fac-
tual allegations so far as they are required for 10(j) purposes") Schneid v. Apple Glass
Co., 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2329, 2331 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (decision to issue a
10(j)injunction based "upon [the] Administrative Law Judge['s] Decision and Or-
der."); .
106. Because the Board's remedies are designed to make aggrieved parties whole,
see supra notes 20, 34 and 74 and accompanying text, any Section 10(j) relief can be
expected to benefit charging parties.
107. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile & Resilient Floor
Covering Layers, Local Union No. 419,410 F.2d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 1969) (declining
to consider issues raised on appeal by charging party in Section 10(1) proceedings
where charging party had not intervened at the district court level and therefore was
not a party litigant); McLeod v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics
Conference Bd., Local 459, 300 F.2d 237, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1962) (same).
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2. Participation by Charging Parties
The language of Section 10(j) provides that the "Board shall
have power" to seek preliminary relief, but it does not specifically
indicate whether a private party may petition for an injunction
under the Act.108 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.109 In Richman
Bros., a corporation had instituted a state court lawsuit to prohibit
a union from picketing its premises.110 The union then brought an
action in federal district court to enjoin the corporation's prosecu-
tion of the state court action, contending that the NLRA pre-
empted state court jurisdiction over the matter.' On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that even if the NLRA preempted the state
court suit, the federal court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin continua-
tion of the state court suit because only the Board or its duly au-
thorized agent may bring an action for injunctive relief under the
NLRA.112 The Court considered that Congress had been specific
in granting the Board the power to seek injunctions under the Act
and concluded that Board institution of Section 10(j) or Section
10(1) proceedings was the sole means by which a federal court
could grant preliminary injunctive relief under the Act.1 3 In so
concluding, the Court noted that "to find exclusive authority for
relief vested in the Board and not in private parties accords with
other aspects of the Act."1 4 The Court thereby recognized that
the Board's exclusive discretion to bring Section 10(j) proceedings
in the preliminary relief stage is closely analogous to the General
Counsel's exclusive discretion in the pre-complaint stage. 15 Thus,
the general rule in the federal labor law scheme is that private par-
ties may not initiate official proceedings against an entity that has
violated the Act, but rather a federal agency must take the initial
decisive action of commencing proceedings.
Although Richman Bros. clearly established that private parties
may not institute proceedings for injunctive relief under the
NLRA, it did not address the question of whether charging parties
may intervene in such proceedings once the Board has brought
108. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).
109. 348 U.S. 511, 512 (1955).
110. See id. at 512.
111. Id. at 513.
112. Id. at 517.
113. Id.
114. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 517 (1955)
(citation omitted).
115. See supra notes 38-39, 51-53 and accompanying text.
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them. While nothing in the text of Section 100) specifically per-
mits or prohibits intervention," 6 charging parties have relied upon
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) for the proposition that
they have the right to intervene in Section 10(j) proceedings
brought by the Board.117
II. Rule 24(a)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), which governs non-
statutory intervention as of right, provides that one has the right to
intervene in a pending action if one claims an interest in the subject
matter of the action that "may" not be adequately represented by
existing parties and the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its inter-
est. 18 The 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules set forth Rule
24(a)(2) in substantially its present form.119 This revised Rule
24(a)(2) combined the pre-1966 Rules 24(a)(2) and 24(a)(3), n °
streamlining the requirements for intervention 2 1 to comport with
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 1600).
117. See, e.g., Wilson v. liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd
as modified, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333(7th Cir. 1981); Youngblood v. Scottex, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619 (N.D. Tex. 1972);
Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
118. Specifically, Rule 24(a)(2) provides:(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely application anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action:(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transac-
tion which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ap-
plicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
119. See 3B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACICE 1 24.01 (2d
ed. 1993). The 1966 Rule used the terms "his ability" and "his interest." Id. In 1987,
Congress replaced these terms with the gender neutral terms "the applicant's ability"
and "the applicant's interest." Id.
120. The pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(2) provided for intervention of right whenever "the
representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate
and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action." 3B JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., supra note 119, J 24.01. Pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(3) additionally entitled
applicants to intervene as of right whenever "the applicant is or may be so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in
the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof."
Id.
121. The Advisory Committee notes explain that the "bound by a judgment in the
action" language of the pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(2) was an undesirable standard. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment. The Committee noted
that such a standard, if read in the literal res judicata sense, would defeat intervention
unnecessarily in some cases, such as class actions. Id. Additionally, the Committee
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the amendments to other Rules.122 The advisory committee noted
that the revised Rule 24(a)(2) replaced the old Rule's formalistic
requirements with an overriding concern for practical considera-
tions.123 The requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) are susceptible to sev-
eral possible interpretations. Moore's FEDERAL PRACTICE sets
forth a four-part test for determining whether an applicant may
intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).1 4 This Note will use a
slightly modified version of Professor Moore's test to evaluate
courts' application of Rule 24(a)(2) in the Section 10(j) context.12
Under this analysis, an applicant may intervene only if (1) no sub-
stantive statute precludes such intervention; (2) the applicant
claims a sufficient interest in the proceedings; (3) the applicant's
ability to protect its interest may be impaired absent intervention;
and (4) the existing parties' representation of the applicant's inter-
est may somehow be inadequate. 126
noted that the language of the pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(3) "unduly restricted" interven-
tion by requiring that the applicant have an interest in "property" in the custody or
control of the court. Id. Courts often read this "property" requirement loosely, con-
ceptualizing fictitious "funds" within their control, so as to insure that the Rule would
be applied justly. Id. (citing Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.
1960) as an example of such loose construction). The "property" requirement there-
fore was deleted and the remaining provisions of the pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(3) were
incorporated into the present Rule 24(a)(2). See FED. R. Cry. P. 24 advisory commit-
tee's note to 1966 amendment.
122. Rule 19 (joinder of parties needed for just adjudication) and Rule 23 (class
actions) were amended contemporaneously with Rule 24. FED. R. Crv. P. 24 advisory
committee notes & 1966 amendment. The Advisory Committee understood interven-
tion of right to be a counterpart to Rule 19(a)(2)(i). Id. The Committee reasoned
that any party whose protectable interest makes it a necessary party for just adjudica-
tion under Rule 19 ought to have the right to intervene in the action on its own mo-
tion. Id. Additionally, the Committee explained that pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(2)'s
requirement that an applicant for intervention be "bound" by the disposition of the
action was inconsistent with amended Rule 23(c)(3). Id. Revised Rule 24(a)(2),
therefore, does not require that an applicant be "bound" by the disposition of the
action. Id.
123. The Advisory Committee explained that "If an absentee would be iubstan-
tially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should,
as a general rule, be entitled to intervene." FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's
note to 1966 amendment.
124. 3B JAMES W. MOORE Ler At-, supra note 119, 1 24.07[1].
125. Under Moore's test, an application must "(1) be timely, (2) show an interest in
the subject matter of the action, (3) show that the protection of the interest may be
impaired by the disposition of the action, and (4) show that the interest is not ade-
quately represented by an existing party." Id. This Note's discussion will assume that
the timeliness requirement is met in each case and will substitute in the analysis an-
other requisite for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention, one so axiomatic that it was not in-
cluded in Professor Moore's test: that the governing substantive statute not preclude
intervention.
126. See supra note 125.
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A. General Requirements for Non-Statutory Intervention as of
Right
1. No Statutory Preclusion
Where Rule 24(a)(2) intervention would frustrate the purposes
of the pertinent substantive statutory law, courts will not allow an
applicant to intervene even if he satisfies the Rule's other require-
ments. Thus, in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers,127 for example,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the rel-
evant statute barred intervention.12' The Court proceeded with ad-
ditional Rule 24(a)(2) analysis only after first determining that the
substantive statute did not preclude such consideration . 29 Where,
for example, a statute provided that certain entities were not to be
parties to a certain type of suit, such an entity could not intervene
pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) because it would frustrate Congressional
intent. 30
2. Sufficiency of Interest
The exact level at which an interest becomes "sufficient" for
Rule 24(a)(2) purposes has not been delineated precisely.' 3' In
many cases, an applicant's interest in the subject matter of an ac-
tion will be apparent, and the court will not need to inquire further
to establish that the interest is sufficient.1 32 On the other hand, an
interest that is not related to the matter before the court does not
give rise to a right of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). 33 Whether
an applicant would have had standing to petition the court for re-
127. 404 U.S. 528, 530 (1971).
128. Trbovich involved interpretation of the Title IV of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1988). Tile IV sets forth
rules for conducting union elections and establishes an enforcement procedure for
those rules, which empowers the Secretary of Labor to investigate alleged improprie-
ties and to sue to set aside union elections conducted in violation of the Title. See id.;
see also infra notes 153-85 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the Trbovich
court's application of Rule 24(a)(2) to the Title IV framework.
129. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 530.
130. The district and circuit courts in the Trbovich case held that Title IV of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1988), precluded intervention by charging parties
under Rule 24(a)(2), although the Supreme Court reversed this holding on appeal.
Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 530, 538. Courts have also ruled that Section 10(j) precludes
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention by charging parties. Wilson v. Liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp.
1120 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd as modfied, 108 L.R.RM. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981),
vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1981); Penello v. Burlington Indus., 54
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963).
131. See 3B JAMs W. MooRE Er A., supra note 119, C 24.07[2].
132. Id.
133. Id.
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lief initially is one factor to consider in determining whether the
applicant's interest is sufficient under Rule 24(a)(2).'3 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Imperial Irrigation District,135 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that, although
an applicant need not have the standing necessary to initiate a law-
suit in order to intervene, a mere interest in establishing a legal
precedent is not sufficient under Rule 24(a)(2).1 36
3. Potential Impairment of Ability to Protect Interest
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention is appropriate only if an applicant's
ability to protect his or her interest may be impaired or impeded as
a practical matter by the disposition of the action.1 37 This require-
ment can be interpreted in two ways. Under one reading, the re-
quirement would be met only where the applicant has an
enforceable present interest that could be affected adversely by the
action.1 38  Charging parties may not institute preliminary injunc-
tion proceedings, and, therefore, they arguably do not have an en-
forceable present interest in the subject matter of Section 10(j)
proceedings.139 Additionally, charging parties generally stand only
to benefit from Section 10() proceedings, rather than be damaged
by them.140 Therefore, they would not be able to intervene as of
right under this analysis.
An alternative approach considers not whether the applicant for
intervention necessarily can be affected adversely by the proceed-
ings, but merely whether, as a practical matter, the proceedings are
important to the applicant. Thus, the issue would be whether the
disposition of the action may substantially affect the applicant's in-
134. Id. Where a party would have had standing to bring suit initially, its interest
certainly is sufficient within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(2). See id. A party who lacked
standing to bring suit initially may nonetheless have a sufficient interest under Rule
24(a)(2), however. See 3B JAwss W. MoORE ET AL.., supra note 119, 1 24.07[2].
135. 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd and vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S. 352(1980).
136. See id.
137. FED. R. Cv. P. 24(a)(2).
138. Notably, under the pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(3), intervention required that an ap-
plicant stood to "be adversely affected" by the disposition of an action. 3B JAbES W.
MOORE ET AL., supra note 119, 24.01. The 1966 amendment eliminated the "ad-
versely affected" requirement in incorporating former Rule 24(a)(3) into the present
Rule 24(a)(2). See Id.
139. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 517(1955).
140. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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terest, either beneficially or adversely. 141 Under this interpreta-
tion, a charging party, who usually stands to be the primary
beneficiary of any Section 10(j) injunctive relief, clearly satisfies
the potential impairment step of the Rule 24(a)(2) analysis.
In practicality, the non-issuance of preliminary relief usually will
have a substantial adverse impact on the charging party. Thus, a
charging party generally would satisfy the potential impairment
prong of the intervention analysis under this approach.
The Supreme Court adopted this latter reading of Rule 24(a)(2)
in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers.142  Under the Supreme
Court's reading of Rule 24(a)(2), the "sufficiency of interest" in-
quiry subsumes the "potential impairment of interest" prong of the
analysis as a matter of practical application, 43 at least in the con-
text of suits brought by government agencies. 144 The Trbovich
test 145 accords with the concern expressed by the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee in its notes to the 1966 amendments of Rule
24, that absentees should be allowed to intervene where they
"would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determi-
nation made in an action."'4 The Trbovich Court's analysis there-
141. This emphasis on the practical importance of proceedings to an applicant ac-
cords with the Advisory Committee's concern that "[i]f an absentee would be sub-
stantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in the action, he
should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene." FED R. Civ. P. 24 advisory com-
mittee's note to 1966 amendment.
142. 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972).
143. Trbovich, the Court first considered the threshold question of whether inter-
vention was precluded by the substantive statute. See id. at 530-36. Then, the Court
used a simple two-part test, holding that "Rule 24(a)(2) gives one a right to intervene
if (1) he claims a sufficient interest in the proceedings, and (2) that interest is not
'adequately represented by existing parties.'" Id. at 538. Essentially, Trbovich
thereby read out the "potential impairment of interest" prong of Professor Moore's
analysis. Compare id. (two-step analysis) with 3B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., supra
note 119, 1 24.07[1] (setting forth a four-part test).
144. The Trbovich Court did not limit its analysis to cases involving government
agencies. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538. However, Trbovich was a case brought by the
Secretary of Labor in vindication of private statutory rights. Id. at 539; see also infra
note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Trbovich). Moreover, the
logic of the Court's test, in practical application, is particularly compelling in the con-
text of suits brought by government agencies. If private party X brings a suit against
private party Y and private party Z stands to benefit incidentally if X wins, but can
not be made worse off in any event, there is no practical reason why Z should be
allowed to intervene because his rights are not at issue. On the other hand, if a gov-
ernment agency brings suit against Y in vindication of Z's statutory rights, practical
concerns militate in favor of intervention even though Z may not have had the right
to bring suit initially and even though there may not be a possibility that Z can be
made worse off as a result of the action.
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
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fore focuses on whether an action is important to an applicant as a
practical matter, rather than on the formalistic distinction between
whether the action is important because it might make the appli-
cant worse off as opposed to better off.147 The Trbovich case will
be discussed in greater detail below.148
4. Adequacy of Representation by Existing Parties
The applicant for intervention bears the burden of showing that
existing parties' representation of the applicant's interest is or
"may be" inadequate, but this burden is "minimal.'149 Inadequacy
of representation can be shown, for example, by evidence of collu-
sion between the representative and an opposing party, by evi-
dence that the representative has or represents some interest
adverse to that of the applicant, or by evidence that the representa-
tive has somehow been lax in representing the applicant's inter-
est.150 An applicant satisfies this inadequacy of representation
requirement where a government agency, acting partly in vindica-
tion of private rights, is the purported representative of the appli-
cant's interest.15 1 Thus, the standard for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention
may be less restrictive when one of the existing litigants is a gov-
ernment agency than when only private parties are involved. 52
147. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Trbovich analy-
sis); infra part I.B (same). This construction is not inconsistent with the "impair or
impede" language of Rule 24. Even though an applicant might stand only to be made
better off by a pending action, the applicant's ability to protect that interest in becom-
ing better off, as a practical matter will be impaired if the government agency loses its
attempt to vindicate the applicant's private rights.
148. See infra part fl.B.
149. See 3B JAMEs W. MOORE Er AL., supra note 119, 1 24.07[4] n.6 (quoting Trbo-
vich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10).
150. See 3B JAMES W. MooRE ET AL., supra note 119, 24.07[4].
151. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528,539 (1972). Where a state
is a party to a suit involving its sovereign interest, on the other hand, courts presume
that it will represent all citizens' interests adequately. See 3B JAMES W. MOORE ET
AL., supra note 119, 1 24.07[4] (citing United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, Inc.,
749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984)).
Where an applicant for intervention has recourse to plenary private remedies, how-
ever, its interest in the proceeding may be insufficient for Rule 24 (a)(2) purposes.
See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 844 (5th Cir. 1975).
152. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Under Trbovich, courts' primary
consideration is the practical importance of the action to the applicant rather than
formalistic consideration of whether the action is likely to make the applicant better
off or worse off. See supra note 139; compare the two-part Trbovich test, 404 U.S. at
530, with Moore's four-part test, 3B JAMEs W. MOORE ET AL., supra note 119,
24.07[1]. As is noted supra note 144, the Trbovkh Court's simplified test is not specif-
ically restricted to suits involving government but it is particularly sensible in that
context.
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B. Rule 24(a)(2) in the Federal Labor Law Scheme
The Secretary of Labor (herein Secretary) initiated the case of
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers153 pursuant to Title IV of the La-
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,154 (herein
LMRDA), seeking to set aside a union election. The LMRDA es-
tablishes substantive rules that govern union elections and provides
a comprehensive enforcement procedure for those rules.' 55 Under
LMRDA Title IV, a union member aggrieved by election conduct
must first seek internal remedies within the union but, thereafter,
"may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor who 'shall inves-
tigate' the complaint. ' 156 If there is probable cause to believe that
a violation has occurred, the Secretary may bring a lawsuit in a
district court to set aside the election.157
In Trbovich, an aggrieved union member filed a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary subsequently brought
suit pursuant to LMRDA Title IV, challenging the results of a
union election.158  The union member then moved to intervene
pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2).159 The district court denied the motion,
ruling that because the LMRDA delegated the power to challenge
a union election in court exclusively to the Secretary, the union
member was barred from intervening.' 60 The court of appeals af-
firmed. 61 After analyzing the requirements for intervention, the
Additionally, the "adequacy of representation" analysis is less restrictive of inter-
vention where a government agency is the purported representative of the applicant's
interest because agencies do not necessarily adhere to their stated positions and be-
cause where an agency brings suit in vindication of private rights as well as in the
public interest, the adequacy of its representation of the private party's interest natu-
rally is questionable. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 537-38; 3B JAMES W. MooRn ET AL,
supra note 119, 1 24.07[4]. In any event, the standard for establishing that existing
parties' representation may be inadequate is "minimal." Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538
n.10.
153. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
154. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
155. See Trbovich 404 U.S. at 531 (citing LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481, 482). Other
provisions of the LMRDA guarantee union members the rights of free speech and
assembly and the right to sue their union, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1988), establish re-
porting and disclosure rules regarding unions' governing documents and financial ac-
tivities, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1988), establish rules governing the imposition and
administration of trusteeship by unions over their subordinate organizations, 29
U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1988), and impose fiduciary responsibilities upon union officers, 29
U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1988).
156. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 531 (quoting LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 482).
157. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 531.
158. Id. at 529.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 530.
161. Id.
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Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court with in-
structions to grant the union member's Rule 24(a)(2) motion to
intervene.162 The Court examined each of the four requirements
for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention in reaching its decision.
1. No Statutory Preclusion
At the outset, the Court considered whether the governing sub-
stantive statute precluded intervention altogether.163 LMRDA Ti-
tle IV gives the Secretary the "exclusive" right to bring suit to set
aside elections already conducted,1" while the enforcement frame-
work with regard to elections already conducted assigns private
parties only the de minimis role of filing a complaint with the Sec-
retary after first exhausting internal union remedies.1 65 Moreover,
Congress's avowed purpose for assigning private parties such a mi-
nor role in Title IV's enforcement framework was to insulate un-
ions from non-meritorious private lawsuits.16 Specifically, the
Trbovich Court noted that Congress intended to prevent private
parties "from pressing claims not thought meritorious by the Secre-
tary, and from litigating in forums or at times different from those
chosen by the Secretary."' 67 For this reason, the Supreme Court, in
Calhoon v. Harvey,'68 had held that the LMRDA prohibits private
parties from bringing lawsuits for the purpose of setting aside a
union election. Nevertheless, the Trbovich Court concluded that
Title IV does not prohibit intervention by private parties unless in-
tervention would frustrate the purposes of that Title entirely.1 69
The Court then took into account that intervention would not
subject defendants to any great inconvenience and that nothing in
the statute specifically prohibited intervention,'7" and therefore
determined that the Title could accomplish its purposes even if
union members intervened in actions brought by the Secretary.1 71
162. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 530.
163. Id. at 532-37.
164. 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1988).
165. See "lbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. at 531 (citing LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 482). A bona-fide candidate for union office may bring suit privately to en-
force Title IV's pre-election requirements, however. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S.
134, 140 n.13 (1964) (citing LMRDA § 401(c)).
166. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 530-36 (discussing legislative history).
167. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 536.
168. 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
169. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 536.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Accordingly, the Court proceeded with the Rule 24(a)(2)
analysis. 72
2. Sufficiency of Interest
The Court then determined that the union member's interest in
the subject matter of the action was sufficient for purposes of Rule
24(a)(2). 73 The Court made it clear that the individual's interest
stemmed from the fact that it was his rights that were at issue in the
lawsuit, and it was he who stood to benefit if the Secretary pre-
vailed. 174 The Court pointed out that although the Act did not give
the individual a separate right of suit, it did give him rights to be
enforced by the Secretary.175 Thus, the Court concluded that the
applicant's interest was sufficient for Rule 24(a)(2) purposes be-
cause the Secretary had brought suit in vindication of the appli-
cant's statutory rights.1 76
3. Potential for Impairment
The Trbovich Court's test for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention has only
two prongs. 177 The Court flatly stated "Rule 24(a)(2) gives one a
right to intervene if (1) he claims a sufficient interest in the pro-
Iceedings, and (2) that interest is not 'adequately represented by
existing parties.' "178 While the Rule requires that the applicant be
"so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect [the ap-
plicant's] interest,"179 the Trbovich Court's two-part test treats po-
tential impairment of the applicant's interest as a factor in
determining whether the interest is substantial. 80 The applicant in
Trbovich did not have the right to bring suit, and he stood only to
benefit from the disposition of the action.' 8' Nevertheless, the
Court held that the requirements for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention
were met.'8 The Court clearly recognized that, because the appli-
cant's statutory rights were the basis of the litigation, the appli-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 538-39.
174. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538.
175. Id. at 539.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 538.
178. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 (quoting FED. R. CIrv. P. 24(a)).
179. FED. R. Cv. P. 24(a)(2).
180. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538.
181. Id. at 530-31.
182. Id. at 539.
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cant's ability to protect his interest in having those rights enforced,
a fortiori, could be impaired by the outcome of the action.
4. Inadequacy of Representation
Turning to the inadequacy of representation prong of the Rule
24(a)(2) intervention analysis, the Court explained that the Secre-
tary acts as a "lawyer" for purposes of enforcing individuals' Title
IV rights, and that this alone was enough to show that the Secre-
tary's representation of the applicant's interest "may be" inade-
quate within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(2).183 The Court noted
that the inadequate representation "requirement of the Rule is sat-
isfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest 'may
be' inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be
treated as minimal."1 4 The Court therefore held that the applicant
had satisfied the inadequate representation prong of its test.ass
Emi. Application of Rule 24(a)(2) to Section 10(j) Proceedings
Because of the similarities between Section 10(j) NLRA pro-
ceedings and Title IV LMRDA proceedings, one might expect that
Rule 24(a)(2) entitles charging parties to intervene in Section 10(j)
procedings just as they can in Title IV LMRDA proceedings.
However, the majority'86 of courts to rule directly on the issue have
denied charging parties' Rule 24(a)(2) motions to intervene in Sec-
tion 10(j) proceedings. One court,1 7 on the other hand, held that
Rule 24(a)(2) entitled the charging party to intervene in a Section
100) proceeding. Additionally, in some Section 10(j) cases, charg-
ing parties have intervened without the court's published opinion
183. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)). It is important to
keep in mind that an existing parties' representation of the applicant's interest need
not necessarily be inadequate for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention to be appropriate, so
long as there is at least the possibility that the applicant's interest "may be"
inadequate.
184. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10.
185. See id. at 539.
186. Wilson v. Liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd as modi-
fied, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333 (7th
Cir. 1981); Squillacote v. UAW Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491, 492-93 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2976 (M.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 515
F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975); Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Penello v. Burlington Indus., 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963); see
also Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No.610, 440 F.2d 124,
132 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming district court's denial of intervention in Section 10(1)
case); Phillips v. United Mine Workers, 218 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (denying
intervention in Section 10(1) case).
187. Youngblood v. Scottex, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619 (N.D. Tbx. 1972).
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specifically addressing whether Rule 24(a)(2) entitled them to in-
tervene as of right.188
Charging parties desire to intervene in Section 10(j) proceedings
in order to offer evidence and argument in favor of the issuance of
injunctive relief and in order to secure appeal rights in the event
that relief is denied at the district court level.189 However, because
of the relative infrequency with which Section 10(j) cases have
been brought until recently and because charging parties generally
will not urge intervention so emphatically as to appear at serious
odds with the Board, there is no over-abundance of reported cases
on the issue. Intervention issues routinely arise in Section 10(j)
cases though,190 and courts have disagreed about the proper inter-
vention analysis to use.191
A. The Majority Approach
Five reported district court opinions have denied charging par-
ties' Rule 24(a)(2) motions to intervene in Section 10(j) proceed-
ings, some of them basing their denials on more than one
188. See, e.g., Pascarell v. Vibra Screw, 904 F2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990); Advertisers
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1982); Scott v. Toyota of Berkely, Inc., 106
L.R.R.M. 2070 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Seeler v. Williams, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2765
(N.D.N.Y. 1977).
189. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Clark v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. transcript of June 23, 1994 hearing,
Civil No. 4:94 cv00308 (M.D.N.C. June 23, 1994) (denying labor union's Rule 24 (a)(2) motion to intervene in Section 10 () proceeding but granting labor union's alter-
native motion to appear as amicus curiae); Garner v. MacClenny Products, Inc., Case
No. 94-604-CIV-J 20 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (labor union permitted to appear as amicus
curiae in Section 10 (j) case); Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., Civil No. CVI 90-226
(S.D. Ga. 1990) (NLRB opposes labor union's Rule 24 (a) (2) motion to intervene in
Section 10 (j) proceeding but does not object to the union's alternative motion to
participate as amicus curiae; see also Pascarell v. Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d 874 (3d Cir.
1990) (labor union appears as intervenor in Section 10 (j) case although published
opinion does not address the intervention issue).
191. Compare Youngblood v. Scottex, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619 (N.D. Tex. 1972)
(granting charging parties motion to intervene); Pascarell v. Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d 874
(3d Cir. 1990) (permitting intervention but not discussing grounds therefor in re-
ported opinion); Advertisers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 677 F2d 544 (7th Cir. 1982)
(same); Scott v. Toyota of Berkely, Inc., 106 L.R.R.M. 2070 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (same)
and Seeler v. Williams, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2765 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (same) with Wilson
v. Liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd as modified, 108
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1981)(denying charging party's motion to intervene); Squillacote v. UAW Local 578, 383 F.
Supp. 491, 492-93 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (same); Boire v. Pilot Frieght Carriers, 86
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2976 (M.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975) (same);
Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (same) and Penello v.
Burlington Indus., 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963) (same).
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ground.19 TWo courts denied intervention on grounds that the
provisions of Section 10(j) preclude consideration of the Section
24(a)(2) analysis.19 Another court concluded that the charging
party's interest in the proceeding was insufficient for Rule 24(a)(2)
intervention purposes.194 Wo courts concluded that Rule 24(a)(2)
intervention would be inappropriate in any event because the
charging party's ability to protect its interest did not stand to be
impaired or impeded by the pending action.195 Finally, four of the
five courts to deny intervention concluded that the Board's repre-
sentation of the charging party's interest was adequate under Rule24(a)(2).196
1. Statutory Preclusion
Although the intervention discussed herein is premised on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than on the provisions of
Section 10 of the NLRA, intervention obviously would be imper-
missible notwithstanding Rule 24(a)(2) if Section 10(j) specifically
prohibited it.197 In Wilson v. Liberty Homes,198 the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin concluded that Section 10j) prohibits Rule
24(a)(2) intervention. The Wilson court noted that whereas Sec-
tion 10(1) provides that the charging party may "appear by counsel
and present any relevant testimony," in preliminary injunction ac-
tions instituted by the Board,199 Section 10(j) does not specifically
grant charging parties any rights of participation.20° The court
therefore inferred that Congress intended to exclude charging par-
ties "from any form of participation in § 10() actions."201
192. Wilson v. Liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd as modi-
fied, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333 (7th
Cir. 1982); Squillacote v. UAW Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491, 492-93 (E.D. W's. 1974);
Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2976 (M.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 515
F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975); Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Penello v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963).
193. See Wilson v. Liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd
as modified, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333(7th Cir. 1982); Penello, 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2165.
194. See Squillacote v. UAW Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491, 492-93 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
195. See Wilson, 500 F. Supp. at 1123; Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
196. See Squilacote, 383 F. Supp. at 492-93; Boire, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2978;
Reynolds, 250 F. Supp. at 722; Penello, 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2165.
197. See supra notes 127-30, and accompanying text.
198. 500 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd as modified, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1982).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1).
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).
201. Wilson, 500 F. Supp. at 1124.
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The conclusion that charging parties may not participate in Sec-
tion 10(j) proceedings is bolstered by the conclusions of other
courts that even Section 10(1) does not grant charging parties the
right to intervene. In Hirsch v. Building & Construction Trades
Council,202 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit denied a charging party's motion to intervene in a Section 10(l)
case. The Hirsch court noted that, because Section 10(1) (like Sec-
tion 10(j)) is an exception to the general rule that federal courts
may not enjoin labor disputes,203 it should be construed nar-
rowly.Y The court concluded that although Section 10(l) entitles
charging parties to "appear by counsel and present any relevant
testimony," it does not entitle them to intervene.205
In Penello v. Burlington Industries,206 the Western District of Vir-
ginia determined that intervention would interfere with the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Board to prosecute unfair labor practices.
Partially for this reason, the Penello court denied the charging
party's motion to intervene.2° It is important to note that both the
Wilson and Penello analyses go a step beyond concluding that the
statute does not grant charging parties the right to intervene. The
cases actually hold that the statute precludes intervention in Sec-
tion 10(j) proceedings under any circumstances.
2. Sufficiency of Interest
In Reynolds v. Marlene Industries,08 the Southern District of
New York determined that Rule 24(a)(2) "presupposes a right in
202. 530 F.2d 298, 307-08 (3d Cir. 1976).
203. See Hirsch v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 530 F.2d 298, 307-08(3d Cir. 1976) (citing Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101).
204. See Hirsch, 530 F.2d at 307-08.
205. Id; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile & Resilient
Floor Covering Layers, Local Union No. 419, 410 F.2d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 1969)
(declining to consider issues raised on appeal by charging party in Section 10(1) pro-
ceedings where charging party had not intervened and therefore was not a party liti-
gant); McLeod v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Bd.,
Local 459,300 F.2d 237,242-43 (2d Cir. 1962) (same). In addition, in Solien v. Miscel-
laneous Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 610, 440 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court's de-
nial of Rule 24(a)(2) intervention in a Section 10(1) case. As is discussed infra notes
216, 257-58 and accompanying text, the Solien court's stated reasons for affirming the
district court's denial of intervention are of questionable continuing validity. The fact
that a circuit court denied intervention under Section 10(1) despite the fact that the
Section guarantees charging parties some rights of participation, however, is some-
what supportive of the notion that Section 10(j) prohibits intervention.
206. 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963).
207. Id.
208. 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the applicant to maintain a claim in this court for relief."' 209 Given
this premise, the court held that because charging parties lack the
right to initiate Section 10j) proceedings,210 they also lack a suffi-
cient interest to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). 211 The
Reynolds court, therefore, denied intervention.212
In Squillacote v. UAW Local 578,213 the court stated that "inter-
vention as of right presupposes that an applicant has a right to
maintain a claim for the relief sought. ' 214 The Squillacote court
therefore denied the charging party's motion to intervene as
well.215 The Squillacote court's analysis is suspect, however, be-
cause it relies primarily upon cases that were decided before the
Supreme Court's decision in Trbovich and before important
changes were made to Rule 24(a)(2).216 The Squillacote court
made no attempt to reconcile its determination that an applicant
must have the right to maintain a claim for relief in court in order
to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) with the Supreme Court's con-
trary holding granting the Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene of an
applicant who had no right to maintain a claim in court for the
relief sought.217
209. Id. at 724.
210. See id. at 723 (citing Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348
U.S. 511, 517 (1955)).
211. See Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
212. Id.
213. 383 F. Supp. 491, 492-93 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
214. Id. (citing Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 610,
440 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971).
215. Squillacote, 383 F. Supp. at 492.
216. The Squillacote court relied upon Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers
Union, Local No. 610, 440 F.2d 124, 132 (8th Cir. 1971), for the proposition that the
Rule presupposes a right to maintain a claim in court. See Squillacote, 383 F. Supp. at
492 (citing Solien, 440 F.2d at 132). In Solien, the Eighth Circuit had relied upon
Reynolds for the proposition that an applicant may intervene pursuant to Rule
24(a)(2) only if he or she could have brought the suit initially. See Solien, 440 F.2d at
132 (citing Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
Notably, Reynolds was decided under the former Rule 24(a)(2) and before Trbo-
vich. Reynolds was decided in 1966 under the former Rule 24(a), under which an
applicant could intervene only if the applicant potentially could be "'bound by a
judgment in the action."' Reynolds, 250 F. Supp. at 723 (quoting FED. R. Cv. P.
24(a)(2)). Trbovich was decided in 1972 under the revised Rule 24(a)(2), which pres-
ently exists in substantially the same form. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404
U.S. 528, 538 n.9 (1972) (quoting FED. R. Cv. P. 24(a)(2), which has changed since
the time Trbovich was decided only in that masculine possessive personal pronouns
have been replaced with gender neutral terminology).
Solien also pre-dated TRbovich. See Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers
Union, Local No. 610, 440 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971).
217. See Squillacote v. UAW Local 578, 383 F. Supp. 491, 492 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539.
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3. Potential Impairment of Interest
Besides holding that Section 10(j) precluded further considera-
tion of the Rule 24(a)(2) intervention analysis, the Wilson court
held that, in any event, the charging party was not entitled to inter-
vene under Rule 24(a)(2) because it could only benefit from the
Section 10() action. 18 Specifically, the court stated, "In this case
there is no possibility that the outcome will adversely affect the
union's ability to protect its interests. '219 Under the Wilson court's
analysis, Rule 24(a)(2) entitles an applicant to intervene only if the
pending action potentially can make the applicant worse off.
4. Adequacy of the Board's Representation
Besides determining that the charging party's interest was insuf-
ficient under Rule 24(a)(2), because "the only real interest in-
tended to be protected by Section 10(j) is the public's interest," the
court in Squillacote further concluded that the Board's representa-
tion was adequate. 220 The court therefore denied the charging
party's Rule 24(a)(2) motion on that ground as well.221 Similarly,
in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers2 the court denied a Rule
24(a)(2) motion to intervene on the ground that "to the extent that
[the charging parties] are attempting here to protect their Section 7
rights, their interest is adequately represented by the Board.'M In
Reynolds, the court concluded that because the Board was "pos-
sessed of expertise developed over the years," it would adequately
represent the applicant's interest.22 Finally, in Penello, the court
concluded that the Board "had not been neglectful in pursuing and
protecting the interests of labor," and therefore denied interven-
tion on grounds that the Board's representation was adequate.'
B. The Scottex Approach
In Youngblood v. Scottex,226 the NLRB instituted Section 10(j)
injunction proceedings against an employer pursuant to charges by
218. See Wilson v. Liberty Homes, 500 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd
as modified, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 673 F.2d 1333
(7th Cir. 1982).
219. Wilson, 500 F. Supp. at 1123.
220. Squilacote, 383 F. Supp. at 492-93.
221. Id.
222. 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2976, 2978 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
223. Id.
224. Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
225. Penello v. Burlington Indus., 54 L.R.R.M. (DNA) 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963).
226. 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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the International Ladies Garment Workers Union that the em-
ployer had engaged in unfair labor practices. The charging union
then moved to intervene in the Section 100) proceeding, relying
upon Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.227 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas de-
termined that Rule 24(a)(2) does entitle charging parties to inter-
vene in Section 100) cases. The court began its discussion of the
governing law by noting the Supreme Court's ruling in UAW Local
283 v. Scofield,tm that charging parties are entitled to intervene in
all Section 10(f) circuit court reviews of final Board orders, even
though Section 10(f) does not expressly provide charging parties
such broad rights of participation. The Scofield case stands for the
proposition that charging parties should be accorded broad partici-
pation rights in federal court unfair labor practice proceedings
even where no statutory authority expressly entitles them to such
participation.2 9 Moreover, Scofield demonstrates that charging
parties have an interest in federal court proceedings to enforce the
Act.730
The Scottex court continued its discussion by noting the Supreme
Court's Trbovich decision granting an individual charging party's
Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene in an action brought by the Sec-
retary of Labor to enforce the charging party's statutory labor law
rights.231 The Scottex court observed that although the Solien v.
Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 610 and Reyn-
olds v. Marlene Industries decisions militated against granting inter-
vention, their holdings were at odds with the Supreme Court's
holding in Trbovich.32 The Scottex court determined that the hold-
ing in Trbovich was "controlling" and therefore granted the charg-
ing party's Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene23 3 By analyzing the
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding participation issues arising
from analogous labor law provisions, the Scottex court recognized
the consistent treatment of private parties by the federal labor law
scheme. Where government agencies are charged with enforcing
labor law statutes, private parties may not bring formal proceed-
227. Id. at 2619-20.
228. 382 U.S. 205, 222 (1965).
229. See id.
230. See Scottex, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2619 (citing Scofield, 382 U.S. 205).
231. See Scottex, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2619-20 (citing Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972)).
232. Scottex, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2620.
233. Id
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ings, but the law nevertheless accords them full rights of participa-
tion and appeal once a government agency initiates proceedings.2- 4
C. Why the Scotter Rule is Correct
The text of Rule 24(a)(2) and the Supreme Court's Trbovich de-
cision interpreting that Rule are the controlling authorities. The
statute and enforcement scheme at issue in the Trbovich case are
closely analogous to the Section 10(j) framework. The Secretary
enforces LMRDA rights in the election context, while the Board
enforces NLRA Section 7 rights. 3s The union member in Trbovich
lacked the right to enforce his LMRDA rights by suit, just as em-
ployees lack the right to institute injunction proceedings to enforce
their Section 7 rights. 236 In both the LMRDA and Section 10(j)
contexts, the government agency bringing suit does so not only in
the public interest but also in vindication of employees' private
rights.2 37 In this sense, the Board acts as the "lawyer" for charging
parties in Section 10(j) cases just as the Secretary acts as a lawyer
for aggrieved union members in LMRDA Title IV cases like Trbo-
vich.238 Thus, all the factors upon which the Supreme Court relied
to determine that Rule 24(a)(2) intervention was appropriate in
Trbovich are at work here.
Additionally, Rule 24(a)(2) intervention in Section 10(j) cases is
consistent with the scheme Congress envisioned when it enacted
the NLRA. In the pre-complaint stage, charging parties do not
have extensive rights of participation; they cannot cause formal un-
fair labor practice proceedings to commence.239 Rather, the Gen-
eral Counsel has discretion whether or not to take the decisive step
of issuing a complaint.20 Once the General Counsel issues a com-
plaint, however, the charging party becomes virtually a full partner
234. Accordingly, while only the Board's General Counsel, and not charging par-
ties, may institute formal unfair labor practice proceedings, charging parties have full
rights of participation and appeal in all subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings
for permanent relief. See supra part I. Additionally, while only the Secretary of Labor
and not charging parties may institute LMRDA Title IV actions to set aside union
elections, charging parties are entitled to become full parties pursuant to Rule
24(a)(2) once the Secretary initiates such an action. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539.
235. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988); Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 531 (discussing LMRDA en-
forcement framework).
236. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964); Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 517 (1955).
237. Compare Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539 with Section 10's enforcement scheme for
employees' Section 7 rights, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 160 (1988).
238. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 539 (1972).
239. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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in terms of its right to participate and appeal throughout the ad-
ministrative processes and any appellate court review.2 1
In both the LMRDA Title IV context and the NLRA adminis-
trative proceedings context, like the Section 100) context, some in-
itial decisive government agency action is a prerequisite for the
private party to obtain relief.24z Such schemes serve the purpose of
insulating purported wrongdoers from frivolous litigation.7"3
Where the government agency brings an action, further insulation
of the purported wrongdoer is unnecessary.2 " Accordingly, charg-
ing parties can intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in LMRDA Title IV
actions instituted by the Secretarym'5 and charging parties are ac-
corded full rights of participation and appeal in post-complaint un-
fair labor practice proceedings that seek permanent relief.246 Thus,
the pervading participation framework in the federal labor law
scheme is consistent with charging parties being allowed to inter-
vene in Section 10(j) proceedings brought by the Board.
The Rule 24(a)(2) analysis that follows demonstrates that, be-
sides the fact that allowing charging parties to intervene is sensible,
all of the factors required for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention generally
are present in the Section 10(j) context.
1. No Statutory Preclusion
Nothing in Section 10() specifically prohibits intervention.2 7
Unless intervention would frustrate the purposes of Section 100),
therefore, the statute should not be read to prohibit interven-
tion.248 Intervention would not frustrate Section 10(j)'s purpose
that the Board have the exclusive right in unfair labor practice
cases to initiate proceedings for injunctive relief, nor would inter-
vention subject charged parties to burdensome multiple litigation
241. See supra notes 50-58, 74-75 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (the Board's General Counsel
has exclusive discretion to initiate formal unfair labor practice proceedings); supra
notes 164-68 and accompanying text (Secretary of Labor has exclusive discretion to
bring suit to enforce Title IV LMRDA rights in post-election setting); supra notes
105-09 and accompanying text (the Board has exclusive discretion to institute Section
10(j) proceedings).
243. See Tbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 536 (1972).
244. Id. (noting that a defendant already subjected to suit is burdened only slightly
more to defend against two plaintiffs instead of one).
245. Id. at 539.
246. See supra notes 54-67, 78-79 and accompanying text.
247. See 29 U.S.C. § 1600).
248. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 536.
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or to new and potentially groundless lawsuits. 249 Although Section
10(1) guarantees charging parties the right to appear by counsel
and present evidence, and Section 10(j) provides no such guaran-
tees, this merely indicates that Section 10() does not itself provide
a right to intervene. The statutory analysis does not lend an infer-
ence that Section 10(j) actually prohibits Rule 24(a)
intervention.250
Moreover, the Penello court's conclusion that granting interven-
tion would interfere with the Board's exclusive jurisdiction to pros-
ecute unfair labor practicesP 1 ignores that the Board would still
have exclusive authority of whether to institute Section 10() pro-
ceedings in the first instance.252 It also ignores that the federal la-
bor law scheme generally allows aggrieved parties extensive rights
of participation once a government agent has taken some definitive
initial action.3 For example charging parties have de minimis
rights of participation and appeal in the pre-complaint stage of un-
fair labor practice proceedings, yet they enjoy extensive rights at all
subsequent administrative and court proceedings for permanent re-
lief.254 Likewise, Title IV of the LMRDA allows the Secretary sub-
stantial discretion as to whether to bring suit to set aside a union
election, but, according to the Supreme Court's holding in Trbo-
vich, Rule 24(a)(2) allows the aggrieved party to intervene as of
right once the Secretary proceeds with such an action.255 A similar
result is required in this context, where the Board has discretion to
commence Section 10(j) proceedings; the charging party should be
allowed to intervene in the proceedings once they are brought.
249. Id.
250. The distinction between Section 10(j) and 10(1) is still meaningfuL If the fed-
eral rules were altered, for example, charging parties might be without any right of
participation in Section 10() proceedings, while their counterparts in Section 10(l)
proceedings would still be guaranteed the right to appear by counsel and offer
testimony.
251. See Penello v. Burlington Indus., 54 L.R.R.M. 2165 (W.D. Va. 1963).
252. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 517
(1955).
253. See supra part I.B. (discussing charging parties rights in post-complaint pro-
ceedings for permanent relief); Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539 (charging party entitled to
intervene as of right once the Secretary of Labor has initiated Title IV LMRDA suit
to set aside a union election).
254. See supra part I.A; part I.B.
255. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539; Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
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2. Sufficient Interest
Courts that have concluded that an applicant must have had a
right initially to maintain an action for relief2 6 are in direct conflict
with the Supreme Court's holding in Trbovich. For example, the
Squillacote court's conclusion that "intervention as of right presup-
poses that an applicant has a right to maintain a claim for the relief
sought"'z57 is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Trbovich,
namely that an applicant was entitled to intervene as of right even
though he did not have an independent right to maintain a claim
for relief in the court.5 8 In the Section 10(j) context, it is the
charging party's rights that the Board seeks to enforce, and the
charging party has the most to gain should relief be granted.259 The
charging party's interest, therefore, is clearly sufficient under the
governing law.
3. Potential Impairment of Interest
Charging parties have an obvious interest in the outcome of Sec-
tion 10(j) proceedings: they stand to be the primary'beneficiary of
whatever relief the court issues.26 Although a charging party may
not be likely to be affected adversely by the proceedings, the appli-
cant's ability to protect its interest in benefitting from a Section
10(j) injunction is impaired if the Board's petition for relief is de-
nied. In any event, under the Trbovich test, formulated by the
Supreme Court to address an issue closely analogous to the one
involved here,2 1 the "potential impairment" prong of the analysis
256. See, e.g., Squillacote v. UAW Local 578,383 F. Supp. 491,492 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Reynolds v. Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
257. Squillacote, 383 F. Supp. at 492. As is noted supra note 216 and accompanying
text, Squillacote relied on Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union, Local
No. 610, 440 F.2d 124, 132 (8th Cir. 1971), for this proposition. See Squillacote, 383 F.
Supp. at 492 (citing Solien, 440 F.2d at 132). Solien, in turn, had relied on Reynolds v.
Marlene Indus., 250 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See Solien, 440 F.2d at 132
(citing Reynolds, 250 F. Supp at 724). Reynolds was decided under the former Rule
24(a)(2) and prior to Trbovich. Neither Solien nor Squillacote reconciled their deter-
ninations that an applicant must have a right maintain a claim for the relief in court
in order to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) with the Trbovich Court's holding granting
the Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene of an applicant who had no right to maintain a
claim for the relief sought in court. Compare Solien, 440 F.2d at 132 and Squillacote,
383 F. Supp. at 492 with Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539. Under close scrutiny, therefore,
neither Squillacote, Solien, nor Reynolds reasonably is persuasive for the proposition
that Rule 24(a)(2) intervention is appropriate only where the applicant initially had
the right to bring suit.
258. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538-39.
259. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 160 (1988); supra part I.C.
260. See supra note 106.
261. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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is merely a part of the "sufficency of interest" test.262 This accords
with the Advisory Committee's emphasis that Rule 24(a)(2) analy-
sis should make practical considerations rather than formalistic
distinctions.263
4. The Board's Representation "May Be" Inadequate
The Board commences Section 10(j) proceedings in order to pro-
tect its power ultimately to remedy harm caused by infringement of
Section 7 rights, such as where an employer discriminates against
employees because of their union activities. Thus, Section 10(j)
proceedings serve the public interest but also serve to vindicate
these private rights.264 The Board, therefore, acts in a capacity
analogous to that of the charging party's "lawyer" for purposes of
enforcing Section 7 rights.265 Accordingly, the Board's representa-
tion "may be" inadequate for Rule 24(a)(2) purposes.2 6 More-
over, the very structure of the administrative scheme is based on
the premise that the Board's representation "may be" inadequate
under the minimal Rule 24(a)(2) standard; otherwise, there would
be no reason to afford charging parties extensive rights of partici-
pation in proceedings for permanent relief. Charging parties enjoy
full rights of participation and appeal in all proceedings for perma-
nent relief subsequent to the issuance of a complaint.267 In addi-
tion, there surely have been instances where charging parties'
counsel have lent vital assistance to the Board in prosecuting unfair
labor practice complaints; charging parties no doubt could be of
similar assistance to the Board in Section 10(j) proceedings. 2a
Granting charging parties the right to intervene at the preliminary
injunctive relief stage following a Board petition for Section 10(j)
relief, therefore, would comport with the enforcement scheme en-
visioned by Congress.
262. See supra notes 143, 178 and accompanying text.
263. The Advisory Committee explained that "If an absentee would be substan-
tially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should,
as a general rule, be entitled to intervene." FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's
note to 1966 amendment.
264. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
265. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538-39.
266. Id.
267. See supra part I.B.
268. In Donovan v. Local Union 70, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 661 F.2d 1199,
1203 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit upheld an award of attorney fees for a charging
party who had intervened in a Title IV LMRDA because the intervenor's counsel had
provided "vital and ongoing" assistance in the preparation and litigation of the case.
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IV. Conclusion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) entitles charging par-
ties to intervene as of right in Section 10(j) proceedings for prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. The Scottex court's analysis and its
determination that the charging party's Rule 24(a)(2) motion to in-
tervene was due to be granted, were correct. The Scottex analysis
comports with the federal labor law scheme and is the only analysis
that takes proper account of the Supreme Court's decision in Trbo-
vich. Moreover, it is the only analysis that is consistent with the
text and purposes of both Rule 24(a)(2) and Section 100).
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